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Abstract
An important side effect of the evolution of the human brain is an increased capacity to form opinions
in a very large domain of issues, which become points of aggressive interpersonal disputes. Remarkably,
such disputes are often no less vigorous on small differences of opinion than large differences. Opinion
differences that may be measured on the real number line may not directly correspond to the subjective
importance of an issue and extent of resistance to opinion change. This is a hard problem for field of
opinion dynamics, a field that has become increasingly prominent as it has attracted more contributions
to it from investigators in the natural and engineering sciences. The paper contributes a scale-free
approach to assessing the extents to which individuals, with unknown heterogeneous resistances to
influence, have been influenced by the opinions of others.
1 Introduction
Observations of opinion changes on an issue are a necessary basis of asserting the existence of some coor-
dinative mechanism of interpersonal influence in which individuals’ opinions are affecting other individuals’
opinions. The classical literature on interpersonal influence was developed with experimental designs with
subjects exposed to a fixed displayed opinion of one or more confederates of the experimenter [1, 2, 3]. In
such designs, where exogenous disturbances on opinions are minimal, interpersonal influence is apparent
when subjects’ displayed opinions are altered in the direction of the displayed fixed position to which each
subject has been exposed.
However, observed extents of opinion differences on the real number line, and opinion changes, depend
the scaling of the opinions and the times at which they are measured,
∆(ij, t) = α
[
x(i, t+ k)− x(j, t)
]
, j ∈ {i, j}, t = 0, 1, 2, ... , (1)
where α > 0 is the scalar value. As t and/or k increase, ∆(ii, t) typically decreases as in Sherif’s [4]
seminal investigation of norm formation, and the observed amount of opinion change will depend on α for
all ∆(ii, t) > 0. The sensitivity of ∆(ii, t) to arbitrary selection of {t, k} temporal measurement points is
ameliorated when x(t) = x(0) are individuals’ pre-process initial opinions and lim
k→∞
x(t+ k) = x(∞) are
their post-process equilibrium opinions. It is aggravated when it is assumed that interpersonal influence
declines as the absolute value of ∆(ij, t) increases, or that interpersonal influence does not exist above
threshold values of | ∆(ij, t) |, especially when these thresholds may vary among individuals [5, 6, 7]. Here,
I shall assume that individuals’ quantitative differences of opinion are not informative of their levels of
resistance to opinion change.
A markedly enlarged scientific community is now engaged in the study of complex systems of inter-
personal influences composed of individuals with heterogeneous initial opinions (some or all of whom are
responding to the changing opinions of others) and heterogeneous extents of resistance to interpersonal in-
fluence. With the influx of investigators from the natural and engineering sciences into the field of opinion
dynamics, the development of mathematical models of opinion dynamics is a rapidly advancing frontier of
scientific work [8, 9, 10]. The collection of observations, which was limited to small groups, now includes the
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behaviors and networks of communicating individuals in large-scale field settings of Internet social media.
The present results contribute an approach to a scale-free derivation of individuals’ heterogeneous resistances
to interpersonal influences in complex systems.
Finite convex sets are important in various areas of basic and applied mathematics, and appear in
linear state-space processes. One area of application is the first-order DeGroot [11] discrete-time state-space
process in which the state of each point of a set n points, xi(k + 1), i = 1, ..., n, is a convex combination of
the immediately prior states of all points of the system xj(k) ∈ R
n, j = 1, ..., n. With a x(0) ∈ Rn and a
row-stochastic W, the model
x(t + 1) = Wx(t), t = 0, 1, ... , (2)
was formulated as a mechanism by which consensus might be reached among a set of individuals. It has
become the benchmark model of the literature on opinion dynamics. Its precursors include the models of
French [12] and Harary [13]. In addition, the model has become increasingly prominent in control theory
[14, 15, 16, 17]. When the mechanism unfolds in an aperiodic irreducible network, the system converges
to a single value on the real number line and, more generally for a X(k) ∈ Rn×m, to a single location in
m-dimensional space.
It will be shown that scale-free interpersonal influences are detectable for this model. Note that the
DeGroot model assumes measures of x(0) and W. In it, the main-diagonal values of W correspond to
individuals’ resistance to interpersonal influence. In practice, a direct measure of these main-diagonal values
are rarely available, so that the measure of W is a matrix with (a) zeros on its main-diagonal and (b) off-
diagonal values that are relative interpersonal weights based on the available network data. Thus, the usual
implementation of the model assumes individuals with zero resistance, who adopt the weighted average of
others’ positions on an issue at each time t. But if the system is, in truth, composed of individuals with
high resistances to opinion change, then the process of consensus formation may be exceedingly slow and
difficult. With high resistances to opinion change, the process may be terminated prior to its convergence
to consensus.
Hence, the analytical problem may formalized as follows. Let C be a row stochastic matrix of relative
interpersonal weights with a zero main diagonal. Given a measure of such a matrix and measures of
individuals’ opinions, what are their’ resistances to opinion change?
2 Scale-free Resistance in the DeGroot Model
With little loss of generality, let 0 < wii < 1 for all i = 1, ..., n. Let D ≡ diag(w11, ..., wnn). Let C ≡
(I−D)−1(W −D). Hence, C = [cij ] is a matrix with cii = 0 for all i and cij = wij/(1− wii) for all i 6= j.
N.B. The foregoing are the theoretical definitions of constructs. The matrix D is the unknown values of the
main-diagonal of W, and the matrix C is the available measure of the relative interpersonal influences of
W.
From the definitions of these constructs, it follows that
W = (I−D)C+D (3)
with which a solution of the resistance values of D is available.
The scalar equation of the DeGroot model may now be expressed in terms of C and D
xi(t+ 1) =
n∑
j=1
wijxj(t), i = 1, 2, ..., n, t = 0, 1, 2, ... .
= (dii)xi(t) + (1− dii)
∑
j 6=i
cijxj(t), (4)
whence
2
dii = 1−
xi(t+ 1)− xi(t)∑
j 6=i
cijxj(t)− xi(t)
, (5)
for
∑
j 6=i
cijxj(t) 6= xi(t).
Under the assumption of a time-invariant W, the derived dii values, i = 1, 2, ..., n, apply to all t. This
assumption may be relaxed with a W(t). In either case, the derived values are scale-free. In applications,
solutions are constrained to the (0, 1) interval. Under the assumption that the model is correct, unreliable or
invalid measurement models of its constructs may generate departures from the (0, 1) interval, and unreliable
or invalid dii values.
3 Discussion
A model-based approach has been presented for a sale-free detection of extents to which individuals’ opinions
are closed or open to interpersonal influences on their issue-specific opinions. Influence detection does not
require full data on the network in which opinion dynamics unfold. Because only direct influences on an
individual are involved in the detection, the approach may be applied to a selected set (or random sample)
of individuals and their adjacent neighbors.
The class of models considered in this paper is based on the assumption that endogenous interpersonal
influence is a convex combination mechanism with weights that are allocated by individuals to their own
and others’ displayed orientations to an object. The available empirical supports for this mechanism are
inconsistent with an assumption that allows negative interpersonal influences or resistances to influences.
The mechanism predicts (a) an initial consensus will be maintained and (b) that modifications of disagreeing
initial opinions will be constrained to range (or convex hull) of initial opinions. These predictions are strongly
supported in the observations of experimental social psychology collected on small groups assembled in
laboratory settings, where individuals’ pre- and post-discussion opinions have been measured.
(a) There is strong support in the literature for the prediction that an initial consensus will be maintained.
Barnlund [18] reported that, in small groups assembled to solve problems of logic, an initial consensus was
not questioned (the group moved on to the next problem) regardless of whether the consensus was correct
or incorrect. Similarly, Thorndike [19] found that an initial consensus was rarely modified regardless of
whether the consensus was correct or incorrect; in his results, an initial consensus was modified in only 3 of
725 group problem-solving trials in which the groups judgment was correct, and in 1 of 263 trials in which
the groups judgment was incorrect. Consensus is either assumed to be correct (whether or not it is) or
satisfactory; in either case, it is deemed conclusive.
(b) Given initial disagreement, Friedkin and Johnsen [20] find one instance of an individual post-
discussion opinion outside the range of initial opinions in 1,000 cases based on 50 groups of tetrads discussing
five issues (two monetary issues and three issues of acceptable risk) in sequence. Similarly, they find one
instance of an individual post-discussion opinion outside the range of initial opinions in 288 cases based on 32
groups of triads discussing three issues of acceptable risk in sequence. A larger incidence of anomaly occurs
in dyads, and appears to be linked to the special property of this smallest of groups in which an aperiodic
influence system is approached as their members’ allocations of weight to their own opinions approach 0.
An additional important property of the class of models considered in this paper is that interpersonal
influence is independent of | ∆(ij, t) |. The available evidence on this matter, amassed over decades, is mixed
[20] and erodes the assertion of a reliable dependency. The subjective importance that individuals assign to
particular opinion differences | ∆(ij, t) | appears to be unconstrained by the values of these differences, so
that large resistances to opinion change may exist for small differences of opinions, and small resistances to
opinion change may exist for large differences of opinions.
From a social psychological perspective, convex combination mechanisms describe an automatic heuristic
“cognitive algebra” [21, 22] with which the brain integrates heterogeneous information. Thus, the influence
network is a social cognition structure assembled by individuals’ allocation of weights to self and particular
others on a specific issue. Investigators in the discipline of experimental social psychology have been re-
markably adept in their detection numerous conditions with effects on the interpersonal influence relation.
The implication of this work is that the antecedents of individuals’ allocated weights are complex, i.e., the
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weights of the convex combination mechanism are net resultants of numerous conditions of the individuals
and their interpersonal relations. As such, the set of ordered pairs of weights, which form an influence net-
work, is unlikely to be based on any single condition, e.g., opinion differences, expertise, authority, rewards,
affection, or coercion.
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